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Malicious software (‘malware’) detection systems 
are usually signature-based and cannot stop attacks by 
malicious files they have never encountered. To stop 
these attacks, we need statistical learning approaches 
to identify root patterns behind execution of malware. 
We propose a machine learning approach for detection 
of malware from portable executable (PE) files. We 
create an ‘entropy time series’ representation of the 
content of each file, and then apply a unique time 
series classification method (called ‘shapelets’) for 
identifying malware. The shapelet-based approach 
picks up local discriminative features from the entropy 
signals. Our approach is file format agnostic, can deal 
with varying lengths in input instances, and provides 
fast classification. We evaluate our method on an 
industrial dataset containing thousands of executable 
files, and comparison with state-of-the-art methods 
illustrates the performance of our approach. This work 
is the first to use time series shapelets for malware 
detection and information security applications. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The evolving volume, variety and intensity of 
vulnerabilities due to malicious software (‘malware’) 
call for smarter malware detection techniques [32]. 
Most existing antivirus solutions rely on signature-
based detection, which requires past exposure to the 
malware being detected. Such systems fail at detection 
of new malware which was previously unseen (‘zero-
day attacks’) [7]. A new zero-day was discovered each 
week on average in 2015 [2]. 
Effective statistical learning approaches can 
automatically find root patterns behind execution of a 
malicious file to build a model that can accurately and 
quickly classify new malware [3,4,29-32,35]. We 
propose a new approach for malware detection from 
Microsoft portable executable (PE) files [26] using an 
advanced time series classification approach, which 
can pick up local discriminative features from data. 
Existing approaches to classification that use entropy 
analysis [16] or wavelet energy spectrum analysis [36] 
often only use global properties of the input signal.   
Time series shapelets. Our approach is based on 
time series shapelets [39]. A shapelet is a subsequence 
from the input (training) time series, which can 
discriminate between classes in the data. Intuitively, 
shapelet-based approaches focus on finding local 
discriminative features within the data, and once these 
are found, the rest of the data is discarded. Shapelets 
have been used for a wide range of time series data 
mining tasks [11,15,21,22,23,27]. 
Entropy representation. Modern malware may 
contain sophisticated malicious code hidden within 
compressed or encrypted files [5,16]. For instance, 
parasitic infections and injected shellcodea often rely 
on packed (compressed) code segments with concealed 
malicious code. Entropy analysis [5,34,37] has been 
used to detect such attacks. As observed by Lyda et al. 
[16], sections of code with packing or encryption tend 
to have higher entropy. We choose to represent each 
PE file by an ‘entropy time series.’ We get byte-level 
content from each file, make non-overlapping chunks 
of the file content, and compute entropy of each chunk. 
This gives us the entropy time series (ETS) 
representationb – one time series for each file. Given 
labeled training data (both benign and malware files), 
our aim is to classify a test file as safe or malicious. 
Thus, we frame the malware detection task as a time 
series classification task. 
Challenges. There are multiple challenges involved 
with malware detection from complex executable files 
found in the wild [4,13,29,31]. The input data varies in 
structure, nature, patterns and lengths of time series. 
Our data has ETS lengths ranging from a couple of 
data points to more than a hundred thousand data 
points. Some subsections of ETS show multiple rapid 
changes in entropy while others are largely flat or zero.
                                                
a Modeling polymorphic shellcode is an intractable problem [33] 
b ‘Time series’ is not meant in the literal sense of time, but in the 
statistical sense of sequential data that is not i.i.d. (independent and 
identically distributed) 
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Figure 1. Entropy time series from malicious/malware files (left/red) and benign/safe files (right/green). Note the wide 
variation in lengths and patterns among the data. 
 
There is no obvious hint or giveaway within the 
structure of the data differentiating the benign files 
from the malicious ones. To illustrate the variety 
within our data, we plot a few randomly selected ETS 
instances from each category (malicious and benign 
PE files) in Figure 1. 
Contributions. In this work, we introduce and 
motivate the use of shapelets in the cybersecurity 
domain for malware detection and file content 
analysis. We convert the malware detection problem 
into a time series classification task, and demonstrate 
the efficacy of our shapelet-based classification 
method on entropy time series representations of 
executable files. From our results, we observe that 
shapelets can learn useful discriminative patterns 
from a very small fraction of the training data and 
perform accurate classification. Further, we show that 
the distance from the shapelet can be used as a single 
(or additional) feature for any supervised learning 
task using an existing classifier. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents related work on malware detection 
and Section 3 motivates the application of shapelet-
based approaches to the computer security domain. 
Section 4 presents relevant background on how the 
shapelet extraction algorithm works. Section 5 
describes our malware detection approach. Section 6 
delineates the dataset and evaluation methods, and 
discusses the observed results. We summarize our 
work and conclude in Section 7. 
2. Related work 
 
Malware detection. Malicious software has 
become rampant in our daily lives, affecting our 
computers and mobile devices. Static analysis 
methods examine the content of a file without 
executing it. As reported in Moser et al. [17], 
deception techniques such as code transformations, 
obfuscations and metamorphism can overcome static 
approaches used by many virus/malware scanners.  
Siddiqui et al. [32] provide an overview of 
malware detection approaches using file features. A 
common source of file features is N-grams (of 
mnemonics of assembly instructions) [35]. N-grams 
are sequences of bytes of a certain length, and 
contain bytes adjacent to each other. These 
approaches typically process an extremely large 
number of N-grams. Wavelet transformations [37] 
are another source for file features. Bilar [6] proposed 
using mnemonics of assembly instructions from file 
content as a predictor for malware. Statistical 
machine learning and data science methods [9] have 
been increasingly used for malware detection, 
including approaches based on support vector 
machines, logistic regression, Naïve Bayes, neural 
networks, deep learning, wavelet transforms, decision 
trees and k-nearest neighbors [4,8,13,16,29-32,37].  
Entropy analysis of malware. Entropy analysis 
[5,16,34,36,37] is an effective technique for aiding 
detection of malware by pointing to the possible 
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presence of deception techniques. Despite 
polymorphism or obfuscation [19], files with high 
entropy are more likely to have encrypted sections in 
them. When a PE file switches between content 
regimes (i.e. native code, encrypted section, 
compressed section, text, padding), there are 
corresponding shifts in its entropy time series [37]. 
Usually in entropy analysis of files for malware 
detection, either the mean entropy of the entire file, 
or entropy of chunks of code sections in the file (as in 
our approach) are computed. This simplistic entropy 
statistics approach may not be sufficient to detect 
expertly hidden malware, which for instance, may 
have additional padding (zero entropy chunks) to 
pass through high entropy filters. In our approach, we 
develop a machine learning approach to 
automatically identify patterns of changes in entropy, 




Novel contribution to malware detection. Even 
though several machine learning classifiers [30] and 
digital forensics methods [10] have been used for file 
analysis and malware detection, this work is the first 
to use time series shapelets in the computer security 
domain in general, and for malware detection in 
particular. We believe shapelets are inherently well-
suited to malware detection as they identify local 
discriminative patterns, and identifying these patterns 
helps identify unknown malware. Shapelets are also 
appropriate for classifying new time series very 
quickly as shown in our experiments, as (i) they 
perform classification on test data very quickly, and 
(ii) they don’t need a lot of training data to learn the 
shapelet patterns. 
Illustrated example. As an example consider the 
following shapelet (in Figure 2) – the red portion 
showing the extracted shapelet subsequence within 
its time series. This was a discriminative shapelet 
extracted from our dataset, details of which are in 
Section 6.2. This shapelet belongs to a time series 
instance from the malware class, and might be 
indicative of malicious behavior with the power to 
predict similar (or dissimilar) subsequences in new 
time series. At a broad view, this shapelet signals that 
a sharp drop in entropy could possibly be indicative 
of malicious code behavior. In Figure 2, the file had 
constant, high entropy for a large portion and then 
there was a large entropy drop – both of which could 
be suggestive of a code obfuscation section. This 
feature would have been detected if the drop occurred 
at a different location in the file, but might not have 
been detected if the scale of the drop was different 
(shapelet feature matching is invariant to horizontal 
translation but not to vertical dilation). These 
invariance properties are well-suited for signaling the 
potential presence of obfuscated code to a malware 
detector: the existence, rather than the location, of the 
obfuscation is what’s important (hence, horizontal 
invariance), and moreover the drop from high 
entropy to different levels of low entropy could 
reflect shifts to different types of content (plain text, 
native code, padding, etc.; hence, vertical non-
invariance).    
 
 
Figure 2. A shapelet found from our dataset 
 
Why shapelets? Despite the existence of many 
other approaches for time series classification [38], 
we use shapelets in our work, as (i) they find local 
and discriminative features from the data, (ii) they 
impose no assumptions on the nature of the data 
unlike autoregressive or ARIMA time series models 
[38,39] and they work even on non-stationary time 
series, (iii) they work on data instances of different 
lengths (unlike popular classifiers such as support 
vector machines, feed-forward neural networks, and 
random forests in their standard forms), (iv) they are 
easy to interpret and visualize for domain experts, 
and (v) they have been shown to be more accurate 
than other methods for some datasets 
[11,12,15,18,20-24,27,39]. Shapelet-based time 
series classification methods have been used in 
diverse application areas including shape mining of 
historical objects [39], bioinformatics and medical 
data analysis [11,27], physical activity recognition 
[27], automobiles and manufacturing [20,24], 
oilfields [21,22], smart-grids [23], and robotics [18]. 
 
4. Background on shapelets 
 
In this section, we explain how the time series 
shapelet extraction algorithm works. We consider a 
binary (two-class) classification scenario. Time series 
shapelets were first proposed by Ye and Keogh [39] 
and there have been optimizations on the initial 
method to make it faster or more advanced 
[12,15,18,20,24,27]. 
First, we introduce the basic brute-force shapelet 
extraction algorithm for time series classification 
[39]. As shown in Algorithm 1, the input dataset, D, 
contains a set of time series instances (TS) and their 
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corresponding labels (Label). Given all the input 
time series and labels, the algorithm generates 
candidate subsequences of all possible lengths from 
all locations across all the training time series. The 
upper and lower length bounds (maxL and minL), as 
well as the ‘length step size’, can be specified as 
parameters.  
As we know, the Euclidean distance between two 
vectors S and 𝑆 (each of length l) is defined by: 
𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑆, 𝑆 =  1𝑙 (𝑆! − 𝑆!)!!!!!  
and the distance between a candidate subsequence S 
of length l and a time series T is calculated as: 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡 𝑆,𝑇 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛!  𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑆,𝑇!!)  
where 𝑇!! is a subsequence at position i and length l 
within the time series T. Thus, it is the minimum 
Euclidean distance obtained by sliding the candidate 
subsequence against the (longer) time series 
instances, and recording the smallest distance 
observed at any position. The distance from each 
candidate to all the data instances in the training set 
are calculated. 
A good shapelet candidate should be able to split the 
training instances into two sets (predicted as 
malware, and predicted as benign) based on distance 
from itself. Each shapelet candidate would make this 
split differently, and we denote the two predicted sets 
created by a shapelet through a split (sp) variable. 
Given a candidate and split pair, we use an 
information gain (InfGain) metric to determine the 
best of the candidates, as:  
InfGain = Entropy(Before) – Entropy(After), 
where Entropy is the total entropy of the dataset, 
thus, the sum of entropy of instances in the two 
classes. Entropy(Before) is the entropy of the 
original dataset when split into two classes (based on 
the label of each instance), and Entropy(After) is the 
entropy of the split generated by the shapelet, thus, 
the sum of the entropy of the two predicted sets in the 
split. A shapelet is the candidate with the maximum 
information gain across the split, which means it is 
the most discriminative subsequence found from 
training data. A distance threshold metric is also 
learnt when identifying the shapelet. 
For complex datasets, one shapelet may not be 
enough to get a clear separation between the two 
classes. In these cases, multiple shapelets are 
extracted and arranged in the form of a tree, similar 
to a decision tree classifier. The tree has shapelets in 
the internal nodes and predicted class labels in the 
leaf nodes. As a test instance traverses this tree, a 
decision on whether to follow the left or right child at 
each (internal) node can be made by comparing the 
distance threshold of the shapelet to the distance of 
the test instance to the shapelet. The test instance is 
classified when a leaf node is reached. 
We use the Fast Shapelets [27] approach. This is a 
state of the art supervised shapelet mining approach, 
which uses random projections to get approximate, 
nearly optimal solutions. Fast Shapelets works with a 
change in data representation – instead of working on 
the raw time series, it works on a dimensionally 
reduced symbolic representation Symbolic Aggregate 
Approximation (SAX), more details of which can be 
found in [14]. This process reduces dimensionality of 
original data and improves generalization of the 
classifier (helping to avoid overfitting). The average 
time complexity for shapelet extraction (training) in 
the Fast Shapelets algorithm is O(mn2) where m is the 
number of time series and n the length of time series. 
 
Given D = [TS, Label] 
max_gain ← 0 
for len = minL to maxL 
 Candidates ← GetCandidates(TS, len) 
 for each cand in Candidates 
  create split sp from cand 
  gain ← InfGain(D, sp) 
  if gain > max_gain 
   max_gain ← gain 
   shapelet ← cand 
  end if 
 end for 
end for 




In this section, we describe our proposed 
approach for malware detection in detail. 
 
5.1. Proposed classification approach 
An overview of our classification approach is 
shown in Figure 3, and it can be summarized in three 
steps (after we have access to the training and testing 
files and class labels).  
 
Figure 3. Overview of our classification approach 
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Step (1) is entropy time series creation. In 
information theory, entropy (more specifically, 
Shannon entropy [28]) is the expected value of 
information contained in a message. Generally, the 
entropy of a variable refers to the amount of disorder 
(uncertainty) in that variable (for example, the 
entropy is zero when one outcome is certain). 
We have multiple labeled instances of both 
malicious and benign files. We convert each of them 
to the entropy time series representation. We perform 
the same preprocessing on the test data files as well 
(before classification). To do this, we consider 
contiguous, non-overlapping chunks of the file 
content and compute entropy for each chunk. The 
size of each chunk is set at 256 bytes (but can be 
changed). The decimal representations in these 
chunks are numbers from 0-255 (hexadecimal 
equivalent of 00-FF) and correspond to assembly 
instructions. Entropy is usually defined as: 𝐻 =  − 𝑝 𝑥 log 𝑝(𝑥) 
Here, the probability p(x) of each byte (ranging 
from 0 to 255) is the count (or frequency) of how 
many times it occurs within the current chunk 
(normalized by the chunk size). So, the entropy of 
each chunk is defined as: 𝐻 =  −  𝑓! log! 𝑓!!""!!!  
Entropy only takes into account the probability 
(here, frequency) of observing a specific outcome, so 
the meaning of the bytes themselves does not matter 
here (only their frequencies). The entropy of each 
chunk is measured in bits and is a non-negative 
number between 0 and 8, both inclusive. 
Step (2) shapelet extraction (Training). Once we 
have the input data in time series format, we can 
perform shapelet extraction. We use the Fast 
Shapelets [27] method for this step. This process 
gives us the shapelets themselves, and a decision tree 
based on shapelets, along with their corresponding 
distance thresholds. Each internal node of the tree is a 
shapelet, while the leaf nodes contain final class label 
predictions. In the shapelet extraction process, we can 
choose the minimum and maximum lengths of 
shapelets we desire to be picked. Alternatively, if the 
minimum length is set to 2 and the maximum length 
to the length of the smallest time series in the dataset, 
then the method can be completely parameter-free. 
We can see that our approach gradually reduces 
the files to entropy time series and then to shapelets, 
in the process of extracting the most relevant and 
discriminative features out of the data.  
Step (3) shapelet-based classification (Testing). 
In the final step of our approach, we use the shapelet-
based decision tree to predict the class label of a new 
test file, presented in the ETS format. The distance of 
the new time series to the shapelet in the root of the 
tree is calculated, and based on whether the distance 
is less or more than the threshold provided, we follow 
either the left or right subtree. This process goes on 
iteratively until we have found a path to a leaf node, 
and then a class prediction for this instance is made. 
Similarly, we classify all the test data instances. 
 
5.2. The ‘distance from shapelet’ feature 
Apart from treating shapelets as a stand-alone 
classifier, we can also view it as a method to obtain a 
single feature (or multiple features) to assist an 
existing classifier that uses many features. This 
feature is based on the distance of a time series 
instance to a shapelet discovered from the training 
data [15,39]. To reiterate, the distance of a time series 
(typically longer) to a shapelet subsequence 
(typically shorter) is obtained by sliding the shapelet 
across the time series and noting the minimum 
Euclidean distance between the shapelet subsequence 
and the corresponding time series subsequences.  
Intuitively, this is similar to compressing the 
whole length of a time series instance to just one 
scalar value – its distance from a shapelet. We may 
have multiple shapelets extracted from a dataset, and 
so, the distance from each shapelet can become a 
feature by itself, or they can be aggregated to form a 
single feature. From our evaluation, we notice that 
this distance is indeed a powerful feature, and even 
though it reduces the dimensionality of the data 
greatly, it still carries a lot of predictive power. 
 
5.3. Enhancements using the PE file format 
Even though our proposed approach is file format 
agnostic, our intention is to classify PE files, and 
thus, our approach can benefit from additional 
information about the PE file structure, outlined by 
Pietrek in [26]. In our approach, we use the complete 
file content to form the ETS. Using selective 
information from the PE file format for specific tasks 
could make our approach more effective. 
For instance, PE files could be analyzed on a 
section-by-section basis. Inside the 
Image_Section_Header structure are two fields 
helpful for identifying padding (non-functional code): 
SizeOfRawData (size of the section as it exists on 
disk) and VirtualSize (how much memory should be 
reserved for the section when it’s loaded from disk to 
memory). SizeOfRawData is almost always a 
multiple of the disk sector size, which is traditionally 
512 bytes, whereas VirtualSize tends to be (but isn’t 
strictly required to be) the exact number of bytes 
occupied by the section.   For example, a section that 
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contains the bytes “ABCDEFG” will have a 
SizeOfRawData of 512 bytes and a VirtualSize of 7 
bytes, and it will be stored in a file as the bytes 
“ABCDEFG” followed by 505 bytes of padding 
(usually zeroes but sometimes a simple repeating 
pattern). Thus, one might discard the 505 bytes of 
padding and expect the overall performance of our 
algorithm to improve. 
In another example, regions of the file expected to 
have a specific type of content (for instance, 
relocations or ‘fix-ups’, compressed content such as 
PNG images, and cryptographic data such as digital 
signatures) could be discarded or handled separately. 
Of course, an adversary could use the discarding 
technique to his or her advantage (by lying about the 
VirtualSize), but more generally, information about 
the PE file structure could certainly be used to 
enhance the performance of our algorithm, and is an 




We describe our dataset, evaluation method and 
results in this section. Due to page limits, we had to 
skip some of our evaluation results and plots in this 
paper (such as experiments on class ratio balanced 
data) – but they can be found in the supporting 
webpage [1] for the paper. 
 
6.1. Data 
We use a real industrial dataset of nearly 40,000 
Windows portable executable files. Half of them are 
labeled as malware, and the other half as benign. 
These files contain a wide range of executables in 
their type and nature. We focus our experimental 
evaluation on a subset of 1,599 files from this set, 
which has also been used by Wojnowicz et al. 
[36,37]. We realize our enterprise dataset is 
proprietary, and we suggest researchers wishing to 
reproduce our work to use similar file content data 
from the Kaggle pagec of the Microsoft Malware 
Classification Challenge at WWW 2015/BIG 2015. 
 
6.2. Experimental methodology 
Shapelet parameters. We perform several 
experiments on many different ratios of random 
training-testing splits from the data, ranging from 
using 10% to 90% of the data for training. Any data 
instance that is not used for training is held out to be 
used in the test set. Unless otherwise specified, we set 
the minimum shapelet length to be found as 5, and 
the length step size for shapelet search as 1. As the 
                                                
c https://www.kaggle.com/c/malware-classification  
Fast Shapelets approach we use is a randomized 
algorithm, the accuracy results vary slightly when the 
method is run multiple times. Unless otherwise noted 
in our evaluation, we report the mean accuracy of 10 
runs (along with the standard deviation) of the 
shapelets classifier on a dataset. We do not normalize 
the time series in our dataset – all the entropy values 
lie between 0 and 8 (both inclusive) and a pilot test 
showed no significant difference in performance 
between the z-normalized and unnormalized datasets. 
File size groups. A challenge dealing with our 
dataset is that the lengths of the ETS (directly leading 
from the lengths of the files generating them) are 
vastly different – ranging from just a few data points 
to more than 100,000, with a mean length of 3,725 
and a median length of 920. For convenience, the 
authors in [37] proposed grouping the dataset into file 
size groups based on ETS lengths. We follow the 
same convention and group all ETS of lengths 
between [2j, 2j+1) into a group J=j. We focus our 
experiments on a set of 1,599 files satisfying J=5 
(ETS lengths between 32 and 64), thus limiting our 
shapelet search to lengths between 5 and 32 (the 
smallest time series in the dataset restricts the 
maximum length of shapelet that can be found). This 
J=5 set has also been picked for evaluation using 
wavelet transformations by Wojnowicz et al. [37], 
and thus we picked it to allow comparisons with their 
wavelet-based method. They proposed a Suspiciously 
Structured Entropic Change Score (SSECS) feature 
for malware classification, and we compare the 
efficacy of our proposed Distance from Shapelet 
(DFS) feature to that of SSECS.  
An extreme experiment. A key observation here 
is that our shapelet learns from data very quickly – 
with only a small percentage used for training. We 
attempted an extreme experiment to illustrate this. 
We randomly sampled 1% of our original (near 
40,000 time series) dataset with the restriction that 
the ETS lengths were between 100 and 10,000 
(which still includes about 80% of our full dataset). 
We extracted shapelets (minL=5, maxL=100) and 
built a shapelet-based decision tree from this 1% set 
(containing 321 time series from 179 benign and 142 
malware files). Nine shapelets were extracted in this 
case to form the decision tree. We used the rest 
(99%) of the data (31,980 time series) for testing, and 
obtained a test accuracy of 67.3%, which is 
comparable to the accuracy obtained by the wavelet 
transformation and entropy approach in [37] using 
80% of the data for training. The first and most 
discriminative shapelet found from this experiment, 




Feature representations. To use existing popular 
classifiers and evaluate the utility of the DFS feature, 
we create a feature representation of the dataset (with 
DFS, SSECS and statistical features). A set of eight 
basic statistical features (also used in [37]) captures 
information about each ETS. They are: 
• Mean 
• Standard Deviation (std. dev.) 
• Signal-to-noise ratio (mean/std. dev.) 
• Maximum entropy 
• Fraction of signal with high entropy 
(>=6.5 bits) 
• Fraction of signal with zero entropy 
• Length of time series 
• Square of length of time series 
 
6.3. Shapelet-based malware classifier 
We present results of our classification approach 
on our chosen dataset of 1,599 files in Figure 4. We 
compare our shapelet-based method to a baseline 
classifier, which assigns every test data instance to 
the label of the majority class in the training dataset. 
Our dataset is quite imbalanced across the two 
classes (as shown by the baseline classifier), but we 
also experimented on a resampled dataset with 
balanced class ratio, with results shown in Figure 6. 
 
 
Figure 4. Classification (test) accuracy 
 
The mean accuracy varies from 87.84% (using 
10% of data for training) to 90.55% (using 90% of 
data for training). We can observe that even on using 
just 10% of the training data, our classifier has 
quickly gained a lot of predictive power. We 
experiment on 9 train-test ratios of the dataset, the 
fraction used for training ranging from 0.1 to 0.9 (in 
increments of 0.1). Every time we have a new train-
test split ratio, we randomly choose whether an 
instance in the original dataset goes to the training or 
testing test. Due to this random splitting, the 
randomized nature of shapelets itself and possibly 
overfitting, it may sometimes happen that even 
though the fraction of data used for training increases 
there is no improvement (or a dip) in the prediction 
accuracy on the test set. The difference between our 
algorithm’s performance and the baseline is much 
stronger for the balanced dataset as seen in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5. Classification accuracy on balanced dataset 
 
6.4. Distance from shapelet feature 
We intend to explore the utility of the Distance 
from Shapelet (DFS) feature, possibly as an 
additional feature in an existing classifier. This 
existing classifier can be any classifier, and we use 
these three – support vector machines (SVM), 
logistic regression classifier (LR) and random forests 
(RF). To implement these classifiers, we used the 
scikit-learn Python package [25] with their default 
parameters. It is likely possible to optimize the 
parameters of each classifier and get higher accuracy, 
but our main goal is a relative comparison of 
classification accuracy across our chosen feature sets. 
We compare performance of each classifier on these 
feature sets: 
1- SSECS – using only the SSECS score 
2- DFS – using only the DFS feature 
3- SSECS+Stat – using SSECS score and 
eight statistical features defined earlier 
4- SSECS+DFS+Stat – using SSECS score, 
DFS, and eight statistical features. 
The evaluation results are shown in Figure 6 and 
Table 1 (results on balanced data available on the 
supporting webpage [1]). For the DFS feature above 
in our evaluation, we only use the distance from the 
first (most discriminative) shapelet extracted – this 
node is the root node of the shapelet decision tree and 
all instances must pass through the root. For all three 
classifiers (RF, LR and SVM), SSECS is always 
outperformed by DFS. When statistical features are 
added to SSECS, the accuracy increases. However, 
adding the DFS feature still improves the overall 
accuracy in a large number of cases. Thus, the DFS 
feature is useful (as a single feature) to add to an 
existing classifier. For SVMs, DFS alone 
outperforms all three other combinations in cases 









Figure 6. Illustrating the efficacy of the Distance 
from Shapelet (DFS) feature. Classifiers used are 
Random Forests (top), Logistic Regression (middle) and 
Support Vector Machine (bottom). 
 
We plot some extracted shapelets (randomly 
picked) from our experiments in Figure 7. The figure 
shows four shapelets extracted from an experimental 
run. The four shapelets (S1 – S4) display a wide range 
of entropy patterns. The S1 (top left) and S3 (bottom 
left) shapelets are indicative of the malware class 
(plotted in red) while the S2 (top right) and S4 
(bottom right) shapelets are indicative of the benign 
class (plotted in green). The lengths of the four 
shapelets are 12, 6, 25, and 7, and their distance 
thresholds for classification are 0.9382, 0.3481, 
2.0527 and 1.7641. The shapelet-based decision tree 





Figure 7. Shapelets extracted from an evaluation run 
(top) and the shapelet-based decision tree for 
classification of new instances (bottom) 
 
7. Conclusions and future work 
 
In this work, we motivated the application of time 
series shapelets for malware detection from 
executable files. Using entropy analysis and shapelet-
based classification, we were able to quickly and 
accurately detect malware from new data. These 
shapelets can be used to perform root cause analysis 
by domain experts (who can interpret their 
meanings), to help direct the attention of machine 
learning algorithms (which process raw bytes of the 
computer program) in “interesting” places, to 
construct shapelet-related features in a larger pool of 
file features (strings, n-grams, etc.) for malware 
detection, or as part of an expert system that would 
pool its judgment along with other expert systems.    
A future direction of research is to find an 
enhanced method for ranking the shapelets found and 
remove any false positives. Network communications 
typically deal with temporal data, and can serve as an 
exciting future use case. Mining timestamped log 
files for detecting attacks on a web server is another 
possible avenue for applying our work. Our results 
encourage further use of shapelet-based time series 
approaches to diverse computer security problems. 
 
Acknowledgements 
The authors thank Derek Soeder, Principal 
Researcher at Cylance Inc., for his contributions in 
numerous fruitful discussions about entropy analysis, 
the PE file format and malware detection. 
6086
  
Table 1. Classification accuracies when using the distance from shapelet as a feature on the J=5 dataset (best results 
highlighted in bold). DFS performs better than SSECS, and also improves accuracy of SSECS+Stat when added to it. 
 
Fraction of data (r) 
used for training à  
(rest for testing) 
r=0.1 r=0.2 r=0.3 r=0.4 r=0.5 r=0.6 r=0.7 r=0.8 r=0.9 
Random Forests          
SSECS 78.98 81.59 81.41 81.38 82.38 81.36 81.43 79.37 80.0 
DFS 82.14 85.52 84.44 84.43 85.92 83.44 85.49 86.76 86.61 
SSECS+Stat 91.1 93.63 92.78 93.08 94.04 95.1 92.83 92.7 96.36 
SSECS+Stat+DFS 92.97 93.68 93.39 92.74 93.93 95.01 93.23 92.92 95.33 
Logistic Regression          
SSECS 85.42 85.13 84.48 84.84 85.04 85.15 85.86 83.17 83.03 
DFS 88.3 89.28 84.48 87.99 85.04 85.15 87.55 83.17 83.03 
SSECS+Stat 88.58 91.58 91.79 91.05 92.27 93.21 92.19 89.52 93.94 
SSECS+Stat+DFS 89.77 91.28 91.81 91.34 92.24 93.57 92.57 90.79 93.94 
SVM          
SSECS 85.42 85.13 84.48 84.84 85.04 85.15 85.86 83.17 83.03 
DFS 88.16 89.81 89.63 88.15 90.72 91.47 90.13 89.11 90.3 
SSECS+Stat 85.14 86.86 86.37 86.67 89.48 89.57 91.77 89.21 90.91 
SSECS+Stat+DFS 85.0 87.01 86.98 88.08 88.69 89.57 91.98 88.6 90.91 
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